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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JAMES C. KIRBY, JR.*
I, RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN EMINENT DO AIN-APPLICABILITY Or HARMLESS
ERROR STATUTE WHERE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL
II. DUE PROCESS
A. Adequate Provision for Compensation in Eminent Domain
B. Regulation of Businesses and Professions
C. Limitations Affecting Probate of Wills
III. IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS
A. Private Contracts
B. Public Grants
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS-JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSIES
V. CLASS LEGISLATION
VI. Ex POST FACTO LAWS
Although a relatively small number of cases turned upon consti-
tutional questions during the survey period, some important decisions
were handed down in this area. In five separate decisions legislation
was declared unconstitutional. The impact of the constitutional de-
cisions varies from the right to millions of dollars in school funds in
Shelby County and the salary of the clerk of General Sessions Court
of Clay County to approval of permanent tenure for all franchised
automobile dealers in the state. The scope of governmental power
over the administration of estates, condemnation of private property
and the pursuit of private businesses brought forth important and
far-reaching judicial pronouncements. Two cases are witness to the
diminishing concern for protection of contractual rights as such from
legislative infringement. Although most decisions dealt with con-
stitutional limitations on legislative power over business, private
property and governmental functions, in one decision the fundamental
procedural rights of one accused of crime were upheld in order to
free him.
I. RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN EMINENT DOMAIN-
APPLICABILITY OF HARMLESS ERROR STATUTE
WHERE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL Is CONSTITUTIONAL
Shook & Fletcher Supply Co. v. City of Nashville' is a decision
*Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, Committee
on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C.
1. 338 S.W.2d 237 (Tenn. 1960).
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which may have serious long-range implications in the Tennessee law
of eminent domain. The overloading of the trial dockets of circuit
courts by condemnation cases is a subject of great concern in Ten-
nessee. The legislature might well determine that this condition
should be remedied by some sort of streamlined procedure or, at least,
that jury trials should be limited to cases where demanded by land-
owners. In most states, condemnation awards are determined by
appraisers or commissioners without the intervention of a common-
law jury at any stage.2 A jury trial in eminent domain is not essen-
tial to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and similar state constitutional provisions, 3
but the Shook & Fletcher case indicates that there is a constitutional
right to a jury trial in eminent domain proceedings in Tennessee by
virtue of article 1, section 6 of the state constitution. 4 If so, the
legislature is powerless to provide any different procedure.
The city of Nashville was condemning property for highway pur-
poses in connection with the Capitol Hill Redevelopment Project.
The right to take was admitted and the only issue was the amount of
damages. Both parties appealed from the jury's verdict, the land-
owner protesting a remittitur and the city assigning errors in the
court's charge to the jury. The trial judge had erroneously in-
structed the jury that it would disregard uncorroborated testimony of
a witness who had testified falsely in any respect.5 The city argued
that this charge denied its right to a jury trial by invading the jury's
exclusive function to determine the weight of evidence. The land-
owner argued that the city had not been prejudiced by this instruction
because of the nature of the evidence and that the harmless error
statute6 was therefore applicable. In reversing and ordering a new
2. 18 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain § 337 (1938).
3. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 694 (1897);
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); In re Third St., 177 Minn. 146, 225 N.W.
86 (1929); Mound City Land & Stock Co. v. Miller, 170 Mo. 240, 70 S.W. 721
(1902); Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N.H. 19 (1840); City of Mitchell v. Western Pub.
Serv. Co., 124 Neb. 248, 246 N.W. 484 (1933); JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN VALUA-
TION AND PROCEDURE § 246 (1953).
4. "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate ......
5. That such a charge is erroneous see Tennessee Cent. R.R. v. Morgan,
132 Tenn. 1, 175 S.W. 1148 (1915); Frierson v. Galbraith, 80 Tenn. 129 (1883).
A proper charge is that the jury "may disregard" or "would be warranted in
disbelieving" the uncorroborated testimony of a witness whom it finds to have
testified falsely in one respect. Garland v. Mayhall, 17 Tenn. App. 449, 68
S.W.2d 482 (M.S. 1933).
6. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-117 (1956). "No verdict or judgment shall be set
aside or new trial granted by any appellate court, in any civil or criminal
cause, on the ground of error in the charge of the judge to the jury, or
on account of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for error
in acting on any pleading, demurrer, or indictment, or for any error in any
procedure in the cause, unless, in the opinion of the appellate court to which
application is made, after an examination of the entire record in the cause,
it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has affected the
results of the trial."
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trial, the court of appeals refused to assess the effect of the erroneous
instruction; it reasoned that the harmless error statute was not ap-
plicable because the city had a constitutional right to trial by jury.
Whether state constitutional provisions merely preserving the
right to jury trial apply to a particular type of case depends upon
whether such right existed in that type of case by statute or common
law when the state's constitution was adopted. If so, it is frozen
into the constitution by a constitutional guarantee that the right to
jury trial shall remain inviolate.7 Since there was no common law
right to trial by jury in eminent domain,8 this question then turns
upon whether a pre-existing statutory right has been frozen into the
state's constitution. 9 As in many states, in Tennessee this question is
complicated somewhat by our adoption of successive constitutions,
in 1796, 1834 and 1870. The constitutions of 1796 and 1834 did not
require trial by jury in eminent domain proceedings in Tennessee'0
and it was first granted by statute in the Code of 1858.11 The question
in the present case was whether this statutory right under the Code
of 1858 became a constitutional right under the provision of the con-
stitution of 1870 guaranteeing that the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate-which was merely a restatement of the same
provision from the earlier constitutions. 12 The landowner argued that
where successive constitutions have been adopted in a state, whether
there is a constitutional right to jury trial is to be determined by
reference to the common law at the time of the adoption of the
first state constitution, a proposition supported by the weight of
authority13 and by previous judicial declarations in Tennessee.14
7. State ex rel Timothy v. Howse, 134 Tenn. 67, 183 S.W. 510 (1916).
8. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); Portneuf Irrigating Co. v. Budge,
16 Idaho 116, 100 Pac. 1046 (1909); Note, 18 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 680.
9. Massachusetts has held that its constitution guarantees trial by jury in
eminent domain proceedings because of a statutory right in effect when its
constitution was adopted. Sawyer v. Commissioner, 182 Mass. 245, 65 N.E.
52 (1902).
10. In the 1831 Compilation by Haywood and Cobb, paragraph 19, under
the caption "Roads, Bridges and Ferries," provision is made for a jury of
view but not for intervention of a common law jury of 12 men.
11. The 1858 Code provisions have been brought forward in TENN. CODE
ANN. § 23-1418 (1956).
12. State ex rel Timothy v. Howse, 134 Tenn. 67, 183 S.W. 510 (1916).
13. "Generally, where successive constitutions have been adopted in a state
or the provisions in the Constitution relating to jury trial have been changed
from time to time, the right continues to exist with the same meaning, extent,
and application that it had at common law and at the time of the adoption
of the first state constitution, and an intervening extension of the right by
statute is not preserved by a subsequent adoption of a new Constitution or
change in the constitutional provisions relating to the right. Sometimes,
however, a new constitutional provision is so worded as to preserve as
constitutional a statutory extension of the right before its adoption." 31
AM. Jui. Jury § 12 (1958); In re Moynihan, 332 Mo. 1022, 62 S.W.2d 410
(1933); Town of Montclair v. Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. 479, 79 A.2d 288 (1951).
14. In State ex rel Timothy v. Howse, 134 Tenn. 67, 183 S.W. 510, 514
19611 1173
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The court rejected this contention with the statement that "we do
not so construe the Constitution or the cases which have dealt with
this subject." Reliance was based principally upon article XI, section
1, of the constitution of Tennessee, which provides that all laws not
inconsistent with the constitution shall continue in force until altered
or repealed by the legislature. This provision was also contained in
both of Tennessee's earlier constitutions 15 and it has never been given
the effect of freezing purely statutory rights into the constitution.16
Indeed, it seems to be merely a statement that the constitution did
not affect previous statutes which were not in conflict with it17
and it expressly recognizes the power of the legislature to alter or
repeal such statutes, which is repugnant to the concept of a con-
stitutional guarantee.
The court also stated, however, that the right of trial by jury in
eminent domain "cannot be taken away by implication, but can
only be taken away, if at all, by an express act of the Legislature,"
thus leaving the way open, if the occasion arises, to hold that the
legislature can eliminate jury trials in eminent domain proceedings
and substitute determination of damages by administrative pro-
ceedings.
The applicability of the harmless error statute where constitutional
rights are involved is also an interesting issue in the Shook &
Fletcher case. It should not be construed as holding that the harmless
error rule can never be applied in any case where there is a con-
stitutional right to trial by jury.
The harmless error statute, by its terms, is applicable to review of
all verdicts and judgments in all civil and criminal causes.18 Before
its enactment in 1911, the appellate courts had applied it as a rule
of practice in criminal cases, where trial by jury has always been a
constitutional right,19 but the harmless error statute, like any other,
cannot be applied to deprive a litigant of a constitutional right. An
erroneous instruction of the sort given in Shook & Fletcher operates
(1915), after quoting article I, section 6 of the 1870 constitution, the court
stated: "The same language was used to express the guaranty in the Con-
stitutions of 1834 and 1796 and its meaning as to the nature of the 'right' is to
be gathered from that language used in the earliest Constitution."
15. See annotations under TENN. CODE ANN., Tenn. Const., art. XI, § 9,
note 1 (1956) ("Historical Background").
16. See Norton v. Brownsville, 129 U.S. 479 (1889); Pepper & Co. v. Wills,
54 Tenn. 35 (1871).
17. The original purpose of the provision in the constitution of 1796 was to
bring forward the laws of North Carolina when Tennessee became a state.
Its provisions were contained in the cession act of North Carolina, N.C.
Pub. Acts 1789, ch. 3, § 1, condition 8. See Fields v. State, 8 Tenn. 167
(1827); Brice v. State, 2 Tenn. 254 (1814); Glasgow v. Smith, 1 Tenn. 144
(1799).
18. See note 6 supra.
19. See Munson v. State, 141 Tenn. 522, 213 S.W. 916 (1919).
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to withdraw evidence from the jury. To this extent such an instruc-
tion invades the jury's constitutional function and denies a con-
stitutional right. In this aspect, the present case is but an applica-
tion of the fundamental principle that error is never harmless, but
always prejudicial, if it denies a fundamental constitutional right.
20
An appellate court will not assess the prejudicial effect of the error
in such a case.
II. DUE PROCESS
A. Adequate Provision for Compensation in Eminent Domain
Catlett v. State2 ' was a proceeding by the state to condemn land
for highway purposes. By demurrer, the landowner challenged the
constitutionality of the statute under which the state proceeded,
chapter 216 of the Public Acts of 1959.22 This statute was a con-
siderable improvement and modernization of Tennessee's eminent
domain proceedings, patterned to a great extent after comparable
federal legislation.2
When proceedings are instituted, the condemner must deposit in
court its estimate of a proper award. If the landowner wishes to con-
test the amount of damages, he may except to the condemner's
allowance and obtain a jury trial24 on the question of damages, but
nevertheless withdraw the deposit. If the jury's award is greater
than the deposit, he is entitled to the difference plus interest from
the date proceedings were instituted. If the award is less, the land-
owner must refund the excess, with interest.
The Tennessee statute added an important and controversial in-
novation to the federal model, however, by providing that no trial
upon the issue of damages may be had until six months after com-
pletion of the project for which the land was taken, or until twenty-
20. 5A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1709, at 840 (1958). Other instances in
which the courts have refused to apply the harmless error rule include
procedural errors denying an accused's right to be apprised of the charges
against him, Vinson v. State, 140 Tenn. 70, 203 S.W. 338 (1918); the right
that the jury judge the law as well as the facts, Dykes v. State, 201 Tenn.
65, 296 S.W.2d 861 (1956); Ford v. State, 101 Tenn. 454, 47 S.W. 703 (1898);
and the accused's right to confront the witnesses against him, Watson v.
State, 166 Tenn. 400, 61 S.W.2d 476 (1933).
21. 336 S.W.2d 8, 337 S.W.2d 462 (Tenn. 1960).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1528 to -1541 (Supp. 1961).
23. 46 Stat. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258 (1958). Unlike the federal statute,
Tennessee's does not provide for passage of title to the condemner upon
institution of proceedings and deposit of the estimated award. The land-
owner has 5 days to challenge the right to take, failing which, possession
may be taken. For a general discussion of the provisions of the 1959 legis-
lation, see Byrne, Condemnation Trials, 1959 Legislation, 26 TENN. L. REv.
486 (1959).
24. No jury of view intervenes. There is no constitutional requirement of
a jury of view. Stokes v. Dobbins, 158 Tenn. 350, 13 S.W.2d 321 (1929).
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four months from the commencement of the proceedings, whichever
is earlier.2
This delayed trial provision was the basis of the landowner's claim
of unconstitutionality of the entire statute. A three-member majority
of the supreme court held the delayed trial provisions to be un-
constitutional in toto. Two members agreed as to the provision for
six months' delay after project completion but would have sustained
delaying trial merely until completion of the project, subject to the
two-year maximum. All members agreed that the unconstitutional
provisions should be elided and the balance of the statute upheld.
To delay access of an injured party to the courts for redress is not
unconstitutional per se. In the exercise of its police power, the state
may do so when the provision for delay bears some reasonable re-
lation to a valid legislative purpose.26 The time of determination and
payment of compensation for taking private property is an element
of the right to "just compensation" which is expressly guaranteed by
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion27 and by the constitutions of Tennessee 28 and all other states.29
Although it is not essential that compensation be paid coincidentally
with the taking,30 the legislature must provide for payment within
a reasonable time and cannot delay payment indefinitely.3 1 How-
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1532 (Supp. 1961).
26. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 712, 719. The opinion of the court in
the instant case relied upon the provisions of TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17,
that "all courts shall be open . . . and justice shall be administered without
delay." However, as Judge Swepston points out in his separate concurring
opinion, this provision in state constitutions generally is deemed to be only
declaratory of fundamental principles and a mandate to the courts, rather
than creating new rights or limiting legislative power. 16A C.J.S. Constitu-
tional Law § 709(b); Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co., 143 Tenn. 86, 223 S.W.
844 (1920). Satisfaction of due process is the usual test for laws delaying
enforcement of rights.
27. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
28. TENN. CoNsT. art. I, § 21.
29. JAHR, EMINENT DoMAiN VALUATION AND PROCEDURE § 36 (1953). North
Carolina's Constitution has no express guaranty but its courts have recognized
the right to compensation as founded on natural justice. City of Raleigh v.
Hatcher, 220 N.C. 613, 18 S.E.2d 207 (1942).
30. Simms v. Memphis C. & L.R.R., 59 Tenn. 621 (1874). In Nashville
Housing Authority v. Doyle, 197 Tenn. 555, 276 S.W.2d 722 (1955), construing
an earlier statute, the court stated that when title passes to the condemner,
payment must be "immediate." As noted by Judge Swepston in his concur-
ring opinion in the instant case, this statement was not only dictum but
erroneous, because "It has been established in this state for a 100 years or
better that no constitutional provision requires actual prepayment before
property is taken." 337 S.W.2d at 464. If payment is delayed, provision for
interest on the award satisfies the requirement of just compensation which
must be an amount sufficient to produce the full equivalent of the value
of the property paid contemporaneously with the taking. United States v.
Klamath Indians, 304 U.S. 119 (1938); JAHR, op. cit. supra note 29, § 176
(1953).
31. Maury County v. Porter, 195 Tenn. 116, 257 S.W.2d 16 (1953) (holding
unconstitutional a provision for 12 months' delay of trial after completion
of the project). JAHR, op. cit. supra note 29, § 38.
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ever, the landowner is entitled to reasonable, certain and adequate
provision for obtaining compensation before his occupancy is dis-
turbed.3 2
The minority and majority agreed in the instant case that to arbi-
trarily require that the landowner wait until six months after com-
pletion of a project was unreasonable because his damages could be
ascertained just as readily immediately upon completion of the
project. The minority would have sustained the provision for delay
until project completion, subject to the two-year maximum, on the
grounds that incidental damages, which should take into account both
incidental benefits and detriment to the remaining land,33 may be
better ascertained after the taking has occurred and the improve-
ments are completed. In the view of the majority, although this
might be true in some instances, it could not justify such a delay of
the day in court of any and all landowners under all circumstances.
34
As stated by Chief Justice Burnett:
We thus think on the basis of common sense and justice and under
the constitutional provision in question that a reasonable delay in allow-
ing the landowner his full right in court as to compensation is perfectly
satisfactory, but to delay it years or months without having any factual
situation to support whether or not such a delay is reasonable, such an
act, or portion thereof, stating this is invalid. What constitutes a reason-
able time, of course, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, and is to be decided in each case as a question of fact
as these things arise.3 5
The majority indicated its agreement with a West Virginia decision
which upheld a similar statute providing only for "reasonable delay"
where the question of reasonableness was left for determination by
the courts.36
The application of the doctrine of elision37 to uphold the balance of
the eminent domain statute gave the court little trouble, since the
32. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1414 (Supp. 1961); State v. Rascoe, 181 Tenn.
43, 178 S.W.2d 392 (1944).
34. Accord, Commonwealth v. Werner, 280 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1955). Where
an entire tract is taken, the only element of damages is the fair market
value of the property at the time of the taking, and no legitimate purpose
would be served by delaying trial until project completion.
35. 336 S.W.2d at 11.
36. Simms v. Dillon, 119 W. Va. 284, 193 S.E. 331 (1937).
37. The doctrine of elision allows the upholding of a statute despite the
invalidity of a portion thereof where a complete enactment remains without
the stricken provision and it appears clearly that the legislature would have
enacted the statute without such a provision. Davidson County v. Elrod, 191
Tenn. 109, 232 S.W.2d 1 (1950); Edwards v. Davis, 146 Tenn. 615, 244 S.W.
359 (1922). Even with a separability clause, the doctrine is to be applied




statute contained a separability clause and the court concluded that
a workable legislative scheme remained. The delayed trial provisions
were held not to be such an inducement to the passage of the balance
of the law that the legislature would not have passed it without
them.38
B. Regulation of Businesses and Professions
Regulation of businesses and professions under the police power
and resulting challenges of violation of due process of law were
involved in two cases decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee
during the survey period. The most important is Ford Motor Co. v.
Pace39 which, with two minor exceptions, upheld the constitutionality
of the Motor Vehicle Commission Act.40 This case is treated in the
survey article on sales but it deserves reference here because it
illustrates the expanding scope of the courts' deference to legislative
exercise of the police power in regulation of private business pursuits.
This 1955 legislation is a detailed and far-reaching regulation of the
distribution and sales of motor vehicles in Tennessee. It establishes
a motor vehicle commission, each member of which must be a licensee
under the act, and which is appointed by the Governor from a list
certified by the Tennessee Automotive Association. The commission
is empowered to make rules and regulations for the licensing of
manufacturers, distributors, wholesalers, auto auctions, dealers and
salesmen. The act sets forth qualifications for licensees, prescribes
license fees and defines grounds for denial or suspension of licenses.
A detailed list of undesirable business and trade practices, such as
misleading advertising, requiring that retail purchasers accept special
accessories, etc., are listed among the grounds for revocation of sales-
men's or dealers' licenses. A similar group of condemned practices
concerning the manufacturer-dealer relationship is listed as grounds
for revocation of manufacturers' or distributors' licenses. They in-
38. This may be questioned. The provision for a deposit of an estimated
award by condemning authorities would appear to have been closely related
to the delayed trial provisions. The court had previously held unconstitu-
tional a condemnation statute which delayed both trial and payment until
twelve months after project completion. Maury County v. Porter, 195 Tenn.
116, 257 S.W.2d 16 (1953). The legislature may have intended advance
payment of the estimated award as provisional compensation during the
period of delay. Without the benefit to the state of the delayed trial pro-
visions, the legislature might well have chosen not to extend to landowners
the benefit of the advance deposit provisions; this provision, theoretically,
could result in the state becoming a creditor of the landowner if a contested
award turns out to be less than the amount deposited. With no delayed
trial provision, there is little reason for a landowner to receive an estimated
award at the time of taking.
39. 335 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1960). An appeal was dismissed by the United
States Supreme Court for want of a properly presented federal question. 364
U.S. 444 (1960).
40. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1701 to -1720 (Supp. 1960).
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clude: (1) refusing to deliver a vehicle to a dealer within 60 days
if it has been advertised for immediate delivery; (2) attempting to
"induce" a dealer to enter into any agreement with a manufacturer,
or to do any other act "unfair to said dealer," by threatening to
cancel any franchise or contractual agreement; (3) offering to sell
to a dealer any supplies or materials as a part of negotiations for
extending or renewing a franchise agreement, whether or not made
a prerequisite to the renewal of the agreement; (4) cancelling a
dealer's franchise "without due regard to the equities of the said
dealer and without just provocation," regardless of the terms of the
cancelled franchise; 41 (5) refusing to allow the dealer to determine
the mode of transportation for delivery of new motor vehicles; and
(6) attempting to enter into a franchise agreement with a dealer who
does not have, at that time, facilities to provide services guaranteed
by new car warranties.
The act provides finally in general terms for hearings and judicial
review of denial, revocation, and suspension of licenses by the com-
mission.
The lower court had declared the act as a whole and each par-
ticular part to be unconstitutional. The grounds of the chancellor's
decision does not appear but a myriad of constitutional objections
were raised. Most of the objections which have been raised in the
past on constitutional grounds to administrative regulatory agencies
were brought forth by the manufacturer and rejected by the supreme
court. The act was held not to be invalid as a burden on interstate
commerce because it applies to all persons and transactions within its
scope regardless of interstate or intrastate character. The features
of the act tending to perpetuate dealers in their franchises were held
not to violate the state constitution prohibition against monopolies.
Powers given to the commission to promulgate regulations were
held not to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
The fact that the commission is to be composed of licensees certified
by the Tennessee Automotive Association was held not to render
the act unconstitutional because of any presumed bias or partiality
upon the part of the association's members. The absence of specific
procedural provisions for the conduct and review of the commission's
hearings was likewise held not to be fatal; the naked provision for
a hearing was construed to require a hearing which meets require-
ments of due process.42
The court treated as a more substantial question whether the
41. The Courts' upholding of this section is discussed under impairment of
contract obligations. See p. 1183 infra.
42. Richardson v. Reese, 165 Tenn. 661, 57 S.W.2d 797 (1933).
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business of selling motor vehicles so affects the public health, safety
and welfare as to be subject to regulation and licensing in the exer-
cise of the state's police power. The court had held recently in Livesay
v. Tennessee Board of Examiners in Watchmaking 3 that the business
of watch-repairing is not sufficiently related to the public welfare
to be within the police power and justify state licensing and regula-
tion. There the court had held that the mere opportunity for a dis-
honest person to defraud his customer in pursuit of a private occupa-
tion does not justify regulation under the police power, or else the
legislature could conceivably regulate any business pursuit.44 The
court distinguished the Livesay case on the grounds that the legislature
could reasonably find that the automobile industry so affected the
state's economy as to justify regulation of sales and distribution. It
also noted that automobile dealers are "economic dependents" of
the company whose cars they sell.
45
After holding the subject matter of the statute to be within the
scope of the police power,46 the court then considered the reasonable-
ness of the particular means adopted to protect the economically
dependent automobile dealers and the public's interest in the auto-
mobile industry. All provisions of the act were upheld except two
of the grounds for revocation of manufacturers' licenses. The second
section listed above, concerning attempts to induce dealers to enter
agreements with manufacturers, or to do any other "unfair act," by
threatening to cancel franchises was held to be "arbitrary and
capricious." 47 The prohibition of "inducement" was regarded as going
so far as to include mere salesmanship. The subsection requiring
manufacturers to allow dealers to choose modes of transportation for
new cars was also stricken on the grounds that it bore no reasonable
relationship to the legislative purpose.
48
The other principal due process problem is whether the franchise
cancellation provisions are sufflcibntly definite to apprise a manu-
facturer or distributor of the actions which could lead to license
43. 323 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1959).
44. For a criticism of the Livesay case, see Overton, Constitutional Law-
1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VA-D. L. REV. 1096 (1959).
45. The court quoted a statement by Mr. Justice Black in his dissent in
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303, 323 (1948).
46. The automobile industry has almost universally been held to be within
the scope of police power. Rebsamen Motor Co. v. Phillips, 226 Ark. 146, 289
S.W.2d 170 (1956); Nelson v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 327, 289 N.W. 388 (1939);
Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealer's and Salesmen's Licensing Bd. v. Memphis Auto
Sales, 103 Ohio App. 347, 142 N.E.2d 268 (1957); Annots., 126 A.L.R. 740
(1940), 134 A.L.R. 647 (1941), 57 A.L.R.2d 1268 (1957).
47. Contra, E. L. Bowen & Co. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 153 F.
Supp. 42 (D. Va. 1957).
48. Accord, General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo.
1956).
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revocation in a particular instance. The court stated that it felt the
provisions could be administered fairly by applying the ordinary
meaning of the terms.
49
Legislation similar to the Tennessee act has been adopted in several
states and has met with varying treatment in the courts.50 The
present decision is consistent with the trend of the cases.
In Hooper v. State,5 1 the defendant had been convicted of practicing
dentistry without a license. In a very brief opinion affirming his
conviction, the supreme court reaffirmed its prior decisions holding
that due process is not denied by the Tennessee statute creating a
board of dental examiners, defining the practice of dentistry and
prohibiting its practice without a license.
C. Limitations Affecting Probate of Wills
Doughty v. Hammond52 involved the rights of innocent purchasers
of land from heirs as against a devisee under an unprobated will. The
decedent died August 6, 1958, and an administrator was promptly
appointed. On September 7, 1958, a suit for partition of land owned
by decedent at his death was filed by one of the heirs. After findings
by the master upon an order of reference that the decedent had died
intestate, the property was sold on August 13, 1959, one year and
seven days after the date of death. In March, 1960, a holographic
49. Accord, Best Motor & Implement Co., v. International Harvester Co.,
252 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1960); Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th
Cir. 1940). In A.F.L. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56
(D. Wis. 1960), a restraining order which had been granted to a dealer in
state court prior to removal was dissolved because the court could not say
that the dealer would probably be successful in his action to enjoin a
manufacturer from cancelling a franchise in violation of a similar Wisconsin
statute. The court was unable to ascertain with sufficient definiteness the
meaning of the words "unfairly," "the equities of said dealer" or "without
just provocation," and its discussion indicates the difficulties which may
confront the courts if manufacturers are bold enough to risk the license
revocation provisions and test the act's application in specific instances. The
district court stated:
"There are many, many circumstances when the meanings of these
words comes into question. Who is to decide? Is a jury or court to
rewrite every contract entered into by an automobile dealer to apply the
thoughts of that jury or of that judge as to what 'is unfair' and as to
what 'is inequitable'? If so, in these cases, there is a situation set up
where the parties are subject to the whims, likes and dislikes, prejudices
or misconceptions of juries or judges. No attorney could conscientiously
advise a client as to what contract provisions would be valid." 183 F.
Supp. at 59.
50. See Best Motor & Implement Co. v. International Harvester Co., 252
F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1960); A.F.L. Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Co., 183 F.
Supp. 56 (D. Wis. 1960); Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys,
142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956); General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F.
Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956); Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir.
1940); Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955).
51. 334 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. 1960).
52. 341 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. 1960).
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will, dated March 15, 1951, was discovered. The will devised the
property to a third person, not an heir of decedent. In an action for
declaratory judgment filed by the purchasers, it was held that they
acquired good title under the partition sale and that the devisee had
no rights in the land.
Ordinarily, the rule of caveat emptor applies to purchasers at a
voluntary partition sale and the purchaser acquires only the title of
the parties whose interest is sold for partition.5 3 Since 1957, a Ten-
nessee statute has provided that after one year from the date of a
decedent's death, a bona fide purchaser for value from his heirs
takes title free of claims under an unprobated will.4 The Doughty
decision arose on demurrer, which conceded the purchaser's lack of
knowledge of the will and challenged this statute as depriving the
devisee of property without due process of law.
The right to dispose of, and succeed to, property by will is purely
statutory and the state may limit, condition, or even abolish the right
as it chooses.55 Since a will is ambulatory, rights of devisees arise
only upon the death of the testator which, in this case, occurred after
the statute in question became effective. Thus the devisee took the
land upon the testator's death subject to this statutory regulation
designed to expedite administration of estates and favor free alien-
ability of the property of deceased persons. This one-year limitation
has the same effect as a statute of limitations upon offering a will for
probate, but without provisions for tolling the period of limitation.
Comparing this one-year period with other statutes of limitations in
Tennessee, the court noted that there are many others of one-year or
less.56 The court then held the one-year period to be reasonable when
considered with the valid legislative purpose of expediting admin-
istration of estates.5 7
Suppose the testator had died before the enactment of the statute
53. Barksdale v. Keisling, 13 Tenn. App. 699 (M.S. 1931); 40 AM. JUR. Parti-
tion § 89 (1942); 2 GIBSON, SUITS IN CHANCERY § 587 n.7 (5th ed. 1956). TENN.
CODE ANN. § 16-110 (Supp. 1961) provides that in such cases the clerk's deed
implies a covenant of seisin and warranty of title by the parties whose
interest is sold, unless otherwise directed in the decree.
54. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-610(4) (Supp. 1961). Other provisions of section
30-610 provide that purchasers from heirs within one year from death take
subject to the claims of creditors if administration is granted within the
year; after one year, if administration has not been granted, a purchaser
takes clear of debts of which he has no knowledge.
55. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942); 57 AM. Jur. Wills § 52
(1948).
56. Apart from the statute in question, there is no statutory limitation in
Tennessee on the time within which a will may be probated. See First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dearth, 198 Tenn. 311, 279 S.W.2d 503 (1955); Alsobrook
v. Orr, 130 Tenn. 120, 169 S.W. 1165 (1914).
57. Accord, State ex rel Bier v. Bigger, 352 Mo. 502, 178 S.W.2d 347 (1944),
upholding a Missouri statute which absolutely bars probate after one year
from the granting of letters of administration.
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and the land had already vested- in the devisee when the statute be-
came effective? As in the case of statutes of limitations affecting exist-
ing causes of action, due process should require only that a reasonable
time be allowed to protect the vested right by offering the will for
probate. Alabama held that its statute of limitations upon probate
started running immediately upon enactment against persons claim-
ing under unprobated wills of testators who died before the effective
date of the legislation. 9 North Carolina reached a similar result
under a statute similar to Tennessee's except that it allows a two-
year period for probate before the devisee's rights are cut off by a
sale by heirs.60 It is safe to assume that the result in the Doughty
case would have been the same if the testator had died before the
effective date of the statute.
III. IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS
In two cases legislation was upheld over the objection that it
impaired the obligation of contract in violation of article I, section 10
of the United States Constitution and article I, section 20 of the
Constitution of Tennessee.61 One involved private contracts and the
other a contract between a municipality and a public utility. The
cases illustrate the almost total demise of the contract impairment
limitation as a separate principle of constitutional law.
A. Private Contracts
In Ford Motor Co. v. Pace,2 which is also discussed in the due
process section of this article, and in the survey article on sales, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld a provision of the Tennessee
Motor Vehicle Commission Act which had the effect of writing new
terms into franchise agreements between automobile manufacturers
and dealers. Section 1714 (h)4 of Tennessee Code Annotated makes
it grounds for revocation of a manufacturer's license if he cancels the
franchise or selling agreement of a dealer "without due regard to the
equities of the said dealer and without just provocation." The section
goes on to make non-renewal of a franchise or selling agreement
"without just provocation or cause" an unfair cancellation and cause
58. Title to realty under a will passes to a devisee upon the death of the
testator. 4 PAGE, WMLs 508 (3d ed. 1941).
59. Gilbert v. Partain, 222 Ala. 459, 133 So. 2d (1931). The testator died
in 1917 and the 5-year limitation on probate was enacted in 1924. The will
was held barred from probate when offered in 1929, 5 years and 3 months
later.
60. Barnhardt v. Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919).
61. The language of both the state and federal constitutional provisions is
the same, prohibiting any law "impairing the obligation of contract."
62. 335 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1960), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 444 (1960).
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for license revocation regardless of the provisions of the franchise or
selling agreement. Thus, if a franchise or selling agreement is
cancellable at the option of the manufacturer or has a stated termina-
tion date after which it must be renewed, the manufacturer is not
free to exercise these contractual rights as originally agreed upon
with the dealer. The law's effect is to grant perpetual tenure to
dealers who were franchised on other terms unless the statutory
considerations of fairness and equity are satisfied in any cancellation
or failure to renew.
By dealing expressly with voluntary contractual relationships and,
in effect, changing the terms of existing contracts, the statute clearly
impairs contract obligations within the meaning of the constitutional
prohibition.63 However, the court had previously determined that
regulation of the sale and distribution of motor vehicles and the
relationship between dealers and manufacturers was a proper subject
for the exercise of the state's police power. Persons who contract
concerning matters subject to regulation under the police power do
so subject to the possible exercise of that power although it may be
latent at the time their agreement was made.
64
The inquiry as in other police measures is simply whether the
particular regulatory measure is reasonably related to the end sought
to be attained by the exercise of the police power, the same test of
validity for all legislation challenged under the due process clause.
If requirements of due process are met, the fact that contractual
obligations are impaired does not limit the state's police power.65
Thus, recording acts may apply to deeds executed before their
passage.66 Lottery tickets67 or contracts for the sale of beer,68 which
were valid when made, may be invalidated by subsequent legislation
prohibiting their subject matter.
It is one thing incidentally to nullify a contract or relieve one of
63. "[L]egislation which deprives one of the benefit of a contract or adds
new duties or obligations thereto necessarily impairs the obligation of the
contract, and when the state court gives effect to subsequent state or muni-
cipal legislation which has the effect to impair contract rights by depriving
the parties of their benefit, and make requirements which the contract did
not theretofore impose upon them, a case is presented for the jurisdiction of
this court." Northern Pac. Ry. v. Duluth, 208 U.S. 583, 591 (1908).
64. Kindleberger v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 155 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 803 (1947).
65. "[T]he interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contract does
not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the
promotion of the commonweal, or are necessary for the general good of the
public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may
thereby be affected. . . . In other words, ... parties by entering into con-
tracts may not estop the Legislature from enacting laws intended for
the public good." Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
66. Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830).
67. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
68. Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1877).
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a contractual liability in the interests of the public welfare and quite
another to impose directly upon a party a contractual relationship
which he never intended to assume, as is done by the perpetual
tenure effects of this statute. It is almost a form of involuntary
servitude of automobile manufacturers to dealers. Granting that this
is within the power of the legislature in a proper case, it would seem
that the presumption of constitutionality should be reversed in such
a case and that an affirmative showing of factual justification should
be required before such a statute is upheld.6 9 However, similar




A utility district operating a natural gas distribution system was
prosecuted for excavating in the streets in violation of a city
ordinance in City of Paris v. Paris-Henry County Public Utility
District.71 A city ordinance in 1956 granted to the defendant utility
district "the exclusive right and franchise" to lay, construct, and
maintain gas pipes in its streets and alleys and to operate a gas
distribution system within the city for a period of twenty-five years.
A condition of the franchise was that the defendant convey to the
city all of its assets upon the city's payment of all of defendant's in-
debtedness, which was recited as consideration for all rights and privi-
leges granted by the city and in lieu of all fees, charges, and licenses
which the city might impose therefor.
In 1959, the city of Paris enacted an ordinance requiring permits
for excavations in the city streets, regulating the manner of such
excavations and even requiring public liability insurance for indemni-
fication of the city. The ordinance also imposed fees for the excava-
69. A comparable case to the present one is Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), sustaining the mortgage moratorium legisla-
tion of Minnesota. This act left defaulting mortgagors in possession during
an extended period for redemption from foreclosure sales subject to the
requirement that they pay a reasonable rental to be determined by the
courts. It was sustained as "emergency legislation" justified by serious
economic depression.
70. Accord, Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F.
Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956); 10 VAND. L. REv. 441 (1957); Kuhl Motor Co. v.
Ford Motor Co., 270 Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955). The Minnesota statute
upheld in the Willys Motors case made it a misdemeanor for a manufacturer
to unfairly cancel a dealer's franchise. The Wisconsin statute upheld in
Kuhl, like the Tennessee statute, merely made it grounds for revocation of
the dealer's license. Where such provisions are penal, they have been held
to apply prospectively only, and not to enforcement of contracts existing at
the time of enactment, else they violate the ex post facto prohibition. General
Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 301 (D. Colo. 1956); Buggs v. Ford
Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1940); But cf. Best Motor & Implement Co.
v. International Harvester Co., 252 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1960).
71. 340 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. 1960).
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tion permits on a graduated scale according to the size of the
proposed excavation, but not to exceed $100 for each permit. The
utility district admitted that it had excavated the streets without
obtaining the required permits but defended the prosecution on the
grounds that the enforcement of the 1959 ordinance against it was
an unconstitutional impairment of its contract with the city as
contained in the prior ordinance.72 The city recorder adjudged the
utility district guilty but the circuit court sustained its defense and
dismissed the cases. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding
the ordinance to be a valid exercise of the city's police power which
could not be limited by the prior contract.
The supreme court first construed the challenged ordinance as
being reasonable and constitutional on its face and within the police
power of the city to protect the health and safety of the public in
its use of the streets.73 The court rejected the defendant's contention
that the ordinance conferred arbitrary power to refuse permits
altogether and construed the ordinance as requiring the issuance of
permits as a ministerial duty upon the filing of an application con-
taining the required information and agreements.74
The ordinance's requirement of permit fees from the defendant
presented a more difficult issue because its contractual rights and
duties under the prior ordinance were expressly in lieu of "all fees,
charges or licenses" imposed by the city for the rights and privileges
granted under the franchise, which included the right to construct
gas pipes in the streets. The court held that the charges for excava-
tion permits were not "fees" within the meaning of the franchise.
They were viewed as being exacted by the city as an incident of its
administration of a valid police power regulation where it acts in
a governmental, rather than proprietary, capacity.
7 5
72. The grant of a franchise by a municipality to a public utility for uses
of the public streets is a contract creating a property right, binding upon the
city in its proprietary capacity, and subject to the constitutional protection
against impairment of contract. Chattanooga v. Tennessee Elec. Power Co.,
172 Tenn. 524, 112 S.W.2d 385 (1938); Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel.
Co., 224 U.S. 649 (1912).
73. Similar regulations, including the requirement of a permit, have been
generally upheld. The permit is an incidental means of enforcement, designed
to inform the city when and where excavations are to be made and to
enable it to insure in advance that proper precautions will be taken for
the protection of the public. Iowa City v. Iowa City Light & Power Co., 90
F.2d 679, (8th Cir. 1937); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioners of
Sewerage, 236 Ky. 376, 33 S.W.2d 344 (1930); City of Carthage v. Garner, 209
Mo. 688, 108 S.W. 521 (1908); City of Buffalo v. Stevenson, 207 N.Y. 258,
100 N.E. 798 (1913); 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 1692(b), 1694
(1950).
74. The ordinance provided that applications "shall be rejected or approved
by the City Manager within twenty-four (24) hours," but apparently it
granted no discretion to the city manager and contemplated issuance of
permits upon filing of applications in the required form.
75. As an example of a fee received by a city in its proprietary capacity,
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This issue depended upon whether the permit fees were for revenue
or regulatory purposes.76 It was not shown that the fees received by
the city would amount to more than its costs of enforcing the police
regulation. Where it is contended that a license fee is invalid as a
revenue measure, it must appear on the face of the ordinance or by
proof that it was in fact intended to be a revenue, and not a police,
measure.77 The court did not deal with the fact that the amount of
the fee was based upon the size of the excavation, even though this
has a doubtful relation to the expenses of the city in processing
applications. Viewing the permit fee as merely an incident of a police
regulation applicable to all members of the public who engaged in
the regulated activity, the conclusion followed that the utility was
subject to all the provisions of the regulation. The city could not
contract away its power to enact and enforce police regulations for
the protection of the public. 8 Since this power was not subject to
contractual limitation and the franchise was construed as not cover-
ing regulatory fees, there had been no impairment of contract.
As these two cases demonstrate, it scarcely pays a litigant to rely
upon contractual rights in resisting the application of measures
claimed to have been enacted in the exercise of the police power,
whether the contract be public or private in nature. The subordina-
tion of public grants to the police power and the expansion of the due
process clause have rendered the impairment of contract clause a
"fifth wheel to the Constitutional Law coach." 79 If the regulation is
the court cited Lewis v. Nashville Gas & Heating Co., 162 Tenn. 268, 40
S.W.2d 409 (1931), which dealt with a municipal franchise conditioned upon
the utility's payment of a specified percentage of its receipts to the city. In
the Lewis case, the state's resumption of regulation of the utility's rates was
held not to abrogate the city's contract rights.
76. If d fee is exacted primarily to regulate activity dangerous to the
public, or deemed to be specially in need of public control, and compliance
with certain conditions is required in addition to the payment of the
prescribed sum, it is a license fee imposed in the exercise of the police power,
53 C.J.S. Licenses § 3, at 452 (1948). The purpose, not the name which the
legislature places on the charge, is controlling. Fox Film Corp. v. Trumbull,
7 F.2d 715 (D. Conn. 1925); Paramount Pictures Distrib. Co. v. Henneford,
184 Wash. 376, 51 P.2d 385 (1935).
77. Rutherford v. City of Nashville, 168 Tenn. 512, 79 S.W.2d 581 (1935).
The fact that some revenue is derived by the city incidentally does not
render a regulatory fee invalid as a tax so long as there is a reasonable
relation between the charge and the regulatory objective. Porter v. City of
Paris, 184 Tenn. 555, 201 S.W.2d 688 (1947).
78. A public contract is void if it is construed as purporting to limit
exercise of the pblice power because "it is beyond the authority of the state
or the municipality to abrogate this power so necessary to the public safety."
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Duluth, 208 U.S. 583, 598 (1908).
79. CoRwin, THE CoNSTrrUioN OF T=E UNITED STATEs or AMERICA 362 (rev.
ed. 1952). The obligation of contracts clause reached its ascendancy in
constitutional interpretation in the years immediately following the war
between the states when the corporate form and public grants to corporations
became widespread. The decline of the importance of the clause first
appeared at about the turn of the century. It was raised in almost 25% of
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sustained under the police power, the impairment of contract clause
will not avail. Where the regulation is not sustained, the due process
of law clause furnishes a sufficient basis for declaring it unconstitu-
tional.
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS-JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSIES
Jurisdiction of the courts to review qualifications of county election
commissioners was the principal issue in Buford v. State Board of
Elections.80  Two citizens and registered voters of Clay County
petitioned the Circuit Court of Davidson County for a writ of
certiorari to review the action of the state board of elections in
appointing elections commissioners for Clay County. It was alleged
that the board had appointed two commissioners who were not
properly qualified and that the appointments were made unlawfully
without notice and public hearing required by law.81
The Circuit Court for Davidson County issued the writ, ordering
the board to certify its records to the court, and overruled the board's
rotions to quash the writ for lack of jurisdiction. The board then
filed its petition for certiorari and supersedeas in the supreme court
alleging that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to issue the
writ. The supreme court ruled for the board, holding that the peti-
tioners, as mere voters and private citizens, had no special interest
apart from the general public, and lacked standing to maintain the
action.
In this respect, the decision applies established principles of justi-
ciability and standing to sue. The judicial power is limited to
justiciable cases or controversies; those claiming to be aggrieved by
such action of a governmental agency must complain of a special
injury "not in common with the body of the citizens."82
The court's opinion in the Buford case then goes a bit further,
the cases challenging state legislation in the United States Supreme Court
between 1888 and 1910. From 1910 to 1921, the proportion shrank to 15%,
and from 1921 to 1930, it fell to 9%. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 91-100 (1938). The moratorium statutes of the thirties caused
a revival in its invocation, but this was only a "flash in the pan" and cases
raising it now very seldom reach the United States Supreme Court. CORWIN,
op. cit. supra at 362.
80. 334 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1960).
81. The claim of a right to notice and hearing would probably not have
been upheld even if considered on the merits. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-211
(1956) provides only that the board's meetings shall be public and preceded
by published notices.
82. Patton v. Chattanooga, 108 Tenn. 197, 65 S.W. 414 (1901). Statutory
certiorari is available only to one "who may be aggrieved by any final order
or judgment of any Board or Commission functioning under the laws of this
state" where no other procedure for review is provided by law. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 27-901 (1956). See East Ridge v. Chattanooga, 191 Tenn. 551, 235
S.W.2d 30 (1950).
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stating that whether a member of a county election commission is
qualified for office is a "political question," and that its determination
"rests entirely with the state board of elections."8 This should not be
taken to mean that qualifications of commissioners of elections is a
question outside the jurisdiction of the courts regardless of how it
arises. Section 2-1003 of Tennessee Code Annotated sets up certain
specific qualifications for commissioners of elections. 'It excludes
certain public officials from serving, makes it a misdemeanor for
disqualified persons to serve, and provides that if disqualified persons
are elected, they shall forfeit the office. It is doubtful if the court
intended to preclude all judicial remedies for enforcement of these
statutory qualifications. A quo warranto type proceeding under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 23-280184 should be available to
enforce the statutory forfeiture of his office against any election
commissioner who is disqualified. 85 The court doubtless intended only
to say that the board of elections, and not the courts, is the judge
of the qualifications of appointees with respect to their general fitness
for office.86 It should not be assumed that the state board of elections-
is free to ignore the statutory qualifications of election commis-
sioners. In other jurisdictions mandamus has even been granted to




A dispute over division of county school funds gave rise to an
interesting decision in Board of Education v. Shelby County.88 Since
1925, the General Education Act has directed division of local school
83. The court cited Jared v. Fitzgerald, 183 Tenn. 682, 195 S.W.2d 1 (1946),
where members of the public, none of them candidates for office, had sought
to set aside a primary election, alleging various violations of election laws
but without charges of fraud or that any irregularities had affected the
results of the election. The decision was adverse to the plaintiffs but it
turned on their lack of standing to sue, not upon absence of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit.
84. This section allows an action in the name of the state against any
person who "unlawfully holds or exercises any public office or franchise" or
whenever "any public officer has done, or suffered to be done, any act which
works a forfeiture of his office."
85. Cf. Algee v. State ex rel Makin, 200 Tenn. 127, 290 S.W.2d 869 (1956);
State ex rel Bryant v. Maxwell, 189 Tenn. 187, 224 S.W.2d 833 (1949); State
ex rel Harris v. Brown, 157 Tenn. 39, 6 S.W.2d 560 (1928).
86. The opinion does not indicate the specific grounds which were alleged
to make the appointed officials unqualified for office. It shows only that the
petitioners alleged that they were "not properly qualified."
87. State ex rel Patton v. Houston, 40 La. Ann. 393, 4 So. 50 (1888); State
ex rel Kelleher v. St. Louis Pub. Schools, 134 Mo. 296, 35 S.W. 617 (1896);
Baird v. Kings County, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893); Bogges v. Buxton,
67 W. Va. 679, 69 S.E. 367 (1910).
88. 339 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1960).
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funds among counties, cities and school districts on the basis of
average daily attendance.89 Since 1947, it has contained a proviso
purporting to allow a different basis of division in particular counties
if so provided by private act.90
Beginning in 1929, a series of private acts applying only to Shelby
County provided for equal division of local funds between the Mem-
phis and Shelby County school systems.9' After the home rule
amendments to the Tennessee constitution were adopted in 1953, the
legislative bodies of the city and county each approved the succeeding
private acts. Average daily attendance figures in 1959 would have
entitled the city to 77% of the local funds. After the county school
board had issued and divided eight million dollars in school bonds,
the city and city school board filed suit claiming $2,189,600 of the pro-
ceeds, in addition to the four million dollars which had already been
paid pursuant to the private legislation and thirty years of practice
between the two systems.
The supreme court upheld the city's contention that both the cur-
rent private act and the proviso of the General Education Act which
authorized it were unconstitutional. However, the ruling was applied
only prospectively and the city was held not to be entitled to share
in the 1959 bond proceeds on the basis of average daily attendance.
The court viewed the General Education Act as providing a
uniform system of public education in all counties throughout the
state. It could conceive of no possible reasonable basis for separate
classification of Shelby County, or any other county, which would
allow local departure from the manner of distributing school funds
established by the general law. In the words of Special Justice
Marable, this could "possibly result in as many different methods of
allocating local school funds as there are counties or school systems
in the State, and could easily open the flood-gates leading to other
such changes in the general law to the end that our single uniform
system of public education would be destroyed, and chaos in our
educational system would, indeed, be the consequence."
The fact that Shelby County is the state's largest, the only basis
89. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-206(5) (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 79-711 to
-712 (Supp. 1961). If county school bonds are payable only from taxes levied
outside cities or school districts operating their own schools, no such division
is required. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-715 (1956).
90. The General Education Acts of 1947, 1949, 1951, 1953, 1955, and 1957
all provided that the average daily attendance provisions should apply
"unless otherwise provided by Private Act" and "should not be construed to
affect" the particular private act then applying to Shelby County. Chapter 14
of the Public Acts of 1959 provided that local systems might continue or
determine to divide local funds on a different basis "by Act of the Legisla-
ture as in Chapter 711 of the Private Acts of 1947, as amended."
91. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1929, ch. 752; Tenn. Priv. Acts 1937, ch. 488; Tenn.
Priv. Acts 1947, ch. 351; Tenn. Priv. Acts 1955, ch. 351.
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argued as supporting the classification, was considered to bear no
reasonable relationship to varying the average daily attendance
formula which was designed to give each local system a fair share
of school funds and afford every child the same opportunity to obtain
an education regardless of his place of residence. With no reasonable
basis for the classification, the special treatment of Shelby County
became an invalid suspension of the general law in favor of the
citizens of a particular county, which violates article XI, section 8,
of the state constitution. Both the private acts suspending the general
law and the enabling provisos of the General Education Act which
authorized such suspension were held to be on the same grounds
and subject to the same infirmity.92
The defendants argued that since the private legislation affected
Shelby County in its exercise of a governmental function, the
legislature could properly pass special legislation affecting it. But
whether a county is affected in a governmental or proprietary
capacity is immaterial if the special act conflicts with the general law
of the state and there is no reasonable basis for classification.93
The fact that the Memphis Board of Commissioners had approved
the private act pursuant to the home rule amendments was held
not to lend validity to otherwise unconstitutional class legislation.
The purpose of the home rule amendments is only to require local
approval, by referendum or vote of the city or county legislative
body, as a condition precedent to enactment of the type of local
legislation which was previously enacted exclusively by private act
of the legislature.94 Home rule does not detract from the constitu-
tional prohibition against special or class legislation. 95 Nor did the
home rule procedure estop the city from later raising the constitu-
tional question or amount to a waiver of its rights to test the act's
constitutionality.9
6
92. Invalidating the enabling proviso of the general law may appear to be
a holding in advance that no such private legislation can ever be justified.
However, the court noted that the language added nothing to the legis-
lature's authority to pass private legislation; if otherwise valid, it could
take such action regardless of whether it had given itself previous authori-
zation. The instant case then does not mean that there could never be any
conceivable justification for separate treatment of any county with respect
to division of local school funds.
93. Davidson County v. City of Nashville, 190 Tenn. 136, 228 S.W.2d 89
(1950); Town of McMinnville v. Curtis, 183 Tenn. 442, 192 S.W.2d 998 (1946).
94. For discussion of the purpose and effects of the home rule amend-
ments, see Kirby, Constitutional Law-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L.
REV. 1021, 1026 (1960); Hunt, Constitutional Law-1954 Tennessee Survey,
7 VAND. L. REv. 763, 768 (1954).
95. Cagle v. McCanless, 199 Tenn. 128, 285 S.W.2d 118 (1955).
96. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-711 to -712 (Supp. 1961) provides that the
governing body of any city or special school district may waive all or part
of its share of county bond proceeds by ordinance or resolution. The instant
case does not deal expressly with these provisions except to discuss the
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-A severability clause enabled the court to elide the invalid
provision of the General Education Act and uphold the balance of its
provisions, thus leaving the average daily attendance formula appli-
cable to Shelby County. With Solomon-like wisdom, the court then
held that the eight million dollar county bond issue should be
divided equally, as provided in the unconstitutional private act, but
that in the future such funds would be divided according to the
general law of the state. Since 1948, the county had sold nine bond
issues for school purposes and all had been divided under the
unconstitutional fifty-fifty formula. The county issued the 1959 bonds
without any notice that the city would assert a claim in a larger
share. Here, the court applied principles of equitable estoppel, citing
statements that parties may so deal with each other upon the
strength of an unconstitutional statute that neither may invoke the
aid of the courts to undo what they themselves have done.97
On the whole, a reasonable accommodation of principles of equity,
constitutional law and orderly administration of government appears
to have been attained by the court in an extremely difficult case.
Clay County v. Stone98 was a suit by a clerk of circuit and criminal
courts who also served as clerk of the Court of General Sessions of
Clay County to determine his rights to compensation under the
Anti-Fee Act.99 Plaintiff's total fees earned as clerk of circuit and crimi-
nal courts did not amount to his statutory minimum, and the question
was whether his fees earned as clerk of the general sessions court
should be added before computating the amount to be paid from the
county general funds to provide his minimum statutory salary.
Plaintiff contended that the county should pay him the difference
between his statutory salary and the fees that he collected from the
circuit and criminal courts without regard to his fees collected as
clerk of the general sessions court.
The private act creating the General Sessions Court for Clay
County'00 had specified that the clerk of the circuit and criminal
courts should also act as clerk of the new court and should be paid
a specified salary for his additional duties. In an unreported case, this
salary provision, like others in similar private acts for other counties,
had been declared unconstitutional as class legislation in violation of
doctrines that waiver requires full knowledge of one's rights and cannot
deprive one of his right to raise the question of unconstitutionality. Pre-
sumably, these provisions would be treated as delegations to the local gov-
erning bodies of power to suspend the state's general law and a local
governing body's action would be treated the same as the private act which
was stricken in the instant case.
97. State v. Hobbs, 194 Tenn. 323, 250 S.W.2d 549, 553 (1952); Roberts v.
Roane County, 160 Tenn. 109, 123; 23 S.W.2d 239, 243 (1929).
98. 343 S.W.2d 863 (Tenn. 1961).
99. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-2401 to -2416 (Supp. 1961).
100. Tenn. Priv. Acts 1949, ch. 285.
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article XI, section 8 of the state constitution, because it suspended
the provisions of General Anti-Fee Act relating to clerks of circuit
and criminal courts.' 01 Subsequently, by Tennessee Public Acts of
1959, chapter 109,102 the legislature established general sessions courts
throughout the state (with a few specified exceptions) and provided
that the clerk of the circuit court in each county should act as clerk
of the newly created general sessions court except where a private
act creates a separate office of clerk.10 3 The 1959 legislation also
provided that the fees earned as clerk of the general sessions court
should constitute part of the fees of the office of circuit court clerk,
and that the clerk should receive such additional compensation for
his services as general sessions court clerk as might be provided by
private act then in effect or thereafter enacted. 104 This provision for
additional compensation is substantially the same as Tennessee Code
Annotated section 8-2411, a previous amendment to the Anti-Fee Act.
For the same reasons for which private acts to the same effect had
previously been stricken, the court held unconstitutional the addi-
tional compensation provisions of section 8-2411.105
Just as a private act could not destroy the uniform compensation
purpose of the Anti-Fee Act, the provision authorizing such private
acts without any basis for classification among counties was also
unconstitutional. The result is laudable since a contrary holding
would have enabled private legislation to return these dual clerks to
the old discredited fee system under which public officials were
encouraged to increase their personal compensation by increasing the
fees of their offices.'
06
Instead of appointing the circuit court clerk to a second office, the
101. Anderson v. Maury County, 193 Tenn. 62, 242 S.W.2d 81 (1951); Free-
man v. Swan, 192 Tenn. 146, 237 S.W.2d 964 (1951); Carmichael v. Hamby,
188 Tenn. 182, 217 S.W.2d 934 (1948). However, in Freshour v. McCanless,
200 Tenn. 409, 292 S.W.2d 705 (1956), where the private act created a new
office of clerk of the general sessions court, instead of merely imposing these
duties upon another clerk, the Anti-Fee Act was held inapplicable because
it did not schedule maximum compensation for clerks of general sessions
courts.
102. TEN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1101 to -1124 (Supp. 1961).
103. TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-1116 (Supp. 1961).
104. TENN. CODE ANN. § 18-408 (Supp. 1961).
105. Although the court does not expressly so state, the same reasoning
would seem to invalidate section 18-408, the similar provision of the 1959
General Sessions Court Act.
106. However, under the holding in Freshour v. McCanless, supra note 101,
the salaries of general sessions clerks serving under private acts establishing
separate offices apparently may still vary from county to county since they
are not limited by the Anti-Fee Act. Their status was not expressly changed
by the general sessions court legislation of 1959. Section 16-1116 provides
that such clerks shall continue to serve in accordance with the provisions of
the private acts creating their offices and section 16-1122, dealing with the
fees of the office, provides only that "after payment of the compensation of
the clerk" all fees shall be paid into the general funds of the county. Under
Durham v. Dismukes, 333 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. 1960), general sessions courts
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1959 legislation was viewed as merely giving him additional duties
ex officio and adding the fees of the ex officio duties to those of his
principal office for determination of fees and salary under the Anti-
Fee Act. By this holding, the court was able to avoid a contention
that it was a violation of article 2, section 26 of the state constitu-
tion 07 for the same person to hold more than one lucrative office.
VI. Ex POST FACTO LAWS
Some subtle principles of statutory interpretation were combined
with the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws 08 in
Stinson v. State,0 9 with the result of terminating six years of pro-
ceedings in a criminal prosecution for robbery. In 1954, the defendant
was indicted by Shelby County for robbery and also as a habitual
criminal. He was found guilty on both counts and was sentenced to
15 years for robbery and to life imprisonment on the habitual
criminal count. At this time, the law of Tennessee provided a
maximum penalty for robbery of not less than five nor more than
twenty-five years. The robbery statute was then amended in 1955
to set the punishment at from five to fifteen years, except that if the
robbery is accompained by use of a deadly weapon, punishment shall
be death by electrocution, subject to commutation by the jury.
In a habeas corpus proceeding in 1959, the conviction was held void
by the Criminal Court for Davidson County because of defects in
the habitual criminal conviction. The defendant was remanded to
local custody and held for a new trial under the 1954 indictment.
This indictment was then quashed upon motion of the attorney
general and the defendant was reindicted for the same offenses under
a new indictment. This resulted in conviction on both counts and a
new sentence to life imprisonment, which was appealed in the present
case. The supreme court reversed.
The amendatory 1955 legislation changing the penalty for robbery
repealed by implication the prior robbery statute under which the
defendant was first indicted." 0 The repeal of a penal statute operates
are treated as local county courts subject to home rule; therefore a clerk's
salary provisions under private acts should be subject to home rule
procedures.
107. "No Judge of any Court of law or equity, Secretary of State, Attorney
General, Register, Clerk of any Court of Record, or person holding any
office under the authority of the United States, shall have a seat in the General
Assembly; nor shall any person in this State hold more than one lucrative
office at the same time; provided, that no appointment in the Militia, or to
the office of Justice of the Peace, shall be considered a lucrative office, or
operative as a disqualification to a seat in either House of the General As-
sembly."
108. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 20.
109. 344 S.W.2d 369 (Tenn. 1961).
110. Haley v. State, 156 Tenn. 85, 299 S.W. 799 (1927); Cole Mfg. Co. v.
Falls, 92 Tenn. 607, 22 S.W. 856 (1893); Terrell v. State, 86 Tenn. 523, 8 S.W.
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as a pardon of offenses committed prior to repeal unless there is an
appropriate savings clause in. the repealing legislation or an appli-
cable separate statute."' This particular repealing legislation con-
tained no such savings clause and the only applicable savings clause
is the general one in Tennessee which provides that repeal of a statute
does not affect any right accrued, penalty incurred or proceeding
pending." 2 Since the original conviction of the defendant on the 1954
indictment had been held to be void," 3 no penalty had been incurred
by defendant within the meaning of the general savings statute. Since
the original indictment had been quashed, there was no pending
proceeding within the meaning of the statute. Thus, the defendant
had been pardoned by this combination of circumstances for the
offense under the pre-1955 law and could not be prosecuted under
the previous robbery statute.
The final question was then whether the defendant could be
prosecuted under the robbery law as re-enacted and amended in
1955. This would be a trial for an offense occurring prior to the
effective date of the applicable criminal statute. Even if the 1955
legislation is viewed as only changing punishment, the ex post facto
prohibition applies not only to statutes creating new substantive
criminal offenses but also to those which change the standard of
punishment previously prescribed for a crime." 4 This principle has
even been applied to invalidate laws allowing a warden to fix and
keep secret the time of excution n5 or requiring solitary confinement
of criminals sentenced to death," 6 where applied to offenses com-
mitted prior to enactment. The conclusion was inescapable that
application of the 1955 robbery law to 1954 offenses would make it
an unconstitutional ex post facto law. The conviction was therefore
reversed and the defendant became a free man.
212 (1888); Poe v. State, 85 Tenn. 495, 3 S.W. 658 (1887); 1 SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1932 (3d ed. 1943).
111. Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 281 (1809); Wharton v.
State, 45 Tenn. 1 (1867).
112. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-1301 (1956).
113. The judgment in the habeas corpus proceeding was not appealed by
the state and the court in the instant case refused to entertain a collateral
attack by the state that the court there lacked jurisdiction to void the convic-
tion under the first indictment.
114. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937); Holden v. Minnesota, 137
U.S. 483 (1890); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1882).
115. Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). But laws have been sustained
providing heavier penalties for new crimes committed thereafter by habitual
criminals. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); McDonald v. Massachusetts,
180 U.S. 311 (1901). Or changing the punishment from hanging to electro-
cution. Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915). Or providing for
close confinement of six to nine months in the penitentiary, in lieu of three
to six months in jail, prior to execution and substituting the warden for
the sheriff or hangman. Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319 (1905).
116. Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 491 (1890).
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